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SOME ASPECTS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
GUARANTEES OF CIVIL LIBERTY
IGNATIUS M. WILKINSONt

WQ JE READ in our Declaration of Independence in the immortal
language of Thomas Jefferson "that all men are created equal,
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights,
that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. That
to secure these rights governments are instituted among men, deriving
their just powers from the consent of the governed."
When the Constitution of the United States was adopted, however, and
submitted to the several states for ratification in September, 1787,
although its preamble provided among other things that it was intended
to "secure the Blessings of Liberty, to ourselves and our Posterity," and
the founding fathers sought to achieve this end by the then novel device
of a separation of the powers of government into three great departments,
executive, legislative and judicial, each designed to act as a check on
the other two, the Constitution itself did not contain any specific provisions aimed at protecting those rights which the Declaration of
Independence declared to be unalienable. In consequence the conventions
of a number of the states at the time of their ratification of the Constitution, to quote from the preamble of the congressional resolution
submitting the first ten amendments for ratification, "expressed a desire
in order to prevent misconstruction or abuse of its powers that further
declaratory and restrictive clauses should be added." Accordingly as
Justice Brewer has pointed out in his opinion in Monongahela Navigation
Co. v. U. S., 1 to quiet the apprehension of many that "without some such
declaration of rights the government would assume, and might be held
to possess, the power to trespass" upon the unalienable rights of the
citizen set forth in the Declaration of Independence, the Senate and
House of Representatives by joint resolution submitted twelve articlesof which ten finally were approved-for ratification by the Legislatures
of the requisite number of states as amendments to the Constitution. The
joint resolution in question was adopted at the session of Congress which
began on March 4, 1789 and which was held right here in New York.
t Dean, Fordham University, School of Law.
Address delivered on March 19, 1941 at the House of the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York at the closing session of the series of Lectures on Law in Its Relation
to Government, Industry and Liberty, held under the auspices of the School of Law of
Fordham University to commemorate the Centenary of the University.
1. '148 U. S. 312, 324 (1893).
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Vermont, the tenth, and Virginia, the eleventh state to ratify the proposed
amendments which made the requisite three-fourths of the states, did so
on November 3rd, and December 15th, 1791, respectively. It is altogether
fitting and proper therefore that in the year 1941 which marks the sesquicentennial of the ratification of the ten amendments comprising our Bill
of Rights as well as the centenary of Fordham University and in the very
city where the Congress met when it submitted the first ten amendments
to the several states for ratification, one of the lectures in the series being
conducted under the auspices of the School of Law of Fordham to mark
the centenary of the University should be devoted to a consideration of
these constitutional guarantees of the liberties of the citizen which our
Declaration of Independence declared to be unalienable.
It is obvious that in the time at our disposal this evening there is not
the opportunity-even assuming that I had the capacity and you the
patience for the task-for an adequate consideration of all of the ramifications of such a topic. I intend therefore to direct your attention to one
or two phases merely of the First Amendment of the Constitution which
particularly concern liberties vital to every one of us.
Let us refresh our recollection briefly on some of the fundamentals of
our subject. The First Amendment to the Constitution reads as follows:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
to assemble, and to petition the
the press; or the right of the people peaceably
'2
government for a redress of grievances. "
As early as 1833 the ten amendments comprising our Bill of Rights were
stated by Chief Justice Marshall to apply as limitations upon the powers
of the federal government only and not upon those of the several states. 3
Beyond doubt this is true of the first eight amendments,4 the Ninth
and Tenth Amendments being of a somewhat different character.
However, the Fourteenth Amendment which was adopted shortly after
the Civil War and declared effective on July 28th, 1868, among other
things provides in its first section that "no State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law"; 5 and' the Supreme Court in
applying this amendment to situations in which statutes of the several
2.
3.
4.

U. S. CoxsT. A.mEN. I.
Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 242, 250 (U. S. 1833).
Eilenbacker v. District Court, 134 U. S. 31, 34 (1890); Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S.

591, 606 (1896).
5. U. S. CONST. AmEND. XIV.
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states have been attacked as invalid under the due process section of the
Amendment gradually has expanded its scope until today the Fourteenth
Amendment constitutes practically as wide a prohibition against state
action interfering with personal liberties as does the First Amendment
above referred to in the field of federal law.6
With this brief outline of the history and something of the fundamentals
of our constitutional protection of the liberties of the citizen it will be
of interest in these days of alleged changing constitutional interpretation
to examine critically and comparatively the attitude of the Supreme Court
toward the liberties of the citizen as disclosed in some of its more recently
decided cases. The turmoil of the times in which we live, the attempt by
federal statutes to give a greater measure of protection to the laboring
man in his dealings with his employer, the consequent strikes and picketing as well as appeals by street assemblies and hand-bills for sympathy
and support in labor controversies, the conflicting ideologies together
with the war in Europe and the consequent efforts here to insure national
solidarity by statutes or school regulations calculated, whether wisely or
not, to inculcate a proper spirit of patriotism in the young, have produced
over the last several years a series of important pronouncements of the
Supreme Court in the field of personal liberty of vital importance to
every citizen. Let us examine them in the order of their decision.
In the case of Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization,' the
Supreme Court with Justices McReynolds and Butler dissenting, held
invalid an ordinance of Jersey City which required a permit as a prerequisite to any public assembly, the law further authorizing a refusal of
the permit where necessary to prevent a disorderly assemblage, disturbance or riot. Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, had this to
say in the course of his opinion on the subject of freedom of assembly:
"We have no occasion to determine whether, on the facts disclosed, the
Davis case was rightly decided, but we cannot agree that it rules the instant
case. Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially
been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used
for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from
ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of
6. Gitlow v. N. Y., 268 U. S. 652 (1923); Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357 (1927);
Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359 (1931); Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U. S. 245 (1934);
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233 (1936); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353
(1937); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242 (1937); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U. S.
444 (1938); Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 160 (1939); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310
U. S. 88 (1940).
7. 307 U. S. 496 (1939).
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citizens. The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and
parks for communication of views on national questions may be regulated in the
interests of all; . .. but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or.
8
denied."
Compare this with the opinion of Justice Edward Douglas White in
Davis v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts,9 where adopting the language
of that great dissenter and liberal, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, then
a member of the Massachusetts Supreme Court, and affirming the judgment of that Court which had sustained the validity of a somewhat similar
ordinance of the City of Boston, he wrote:
"For the legislature absolutely or conditioially to forbid public speaking in a
highway or public park is no more an infringement of the rights of a member of
the public than for the owner of a private house to forbid it in his house."' 0
Although the opinion of Justice Roberts in the Hague case attempts to
distinguish the Davis case because of a difference in the scope of the
Boston ordinance, Justice Butler dissented on the specific ground that the
Davis case was controlling in the Hague litigation. Certainly it would
seem that in the reasoning at least of the latter decision the earlier has
been definitely overruled.
"Fine," perhaps you will exclaim, "In these days freedom of speech
and of assembly certainly need protection. It is good to discover that
whereas in 1897 freedom of speech and of assembly meant at most the
liberty to go hire a hall, now they have been expanded to include the more
or less wide open spaces as well." Here then we find an instance of a
definite enlargement of the concept of liberty as applied to the rights of the
citizen. It is an enlargement, however, it should be noted-and I shall
have occasion to refer to this again before I conclude-which has
been purchased at the expense of jettisoning a precedent which has stood
untouched for over forty years. Let us next look at Schneider v. State."
This case, and three others decided at the same time, involved the validity
of municipal ordinances prohibiting the distribution of hand-bills or
circulars and in one case prohibiting as well any canvassing or solicitation.
In three cases the prohibition was absolute. In Schneider v. State, the
New Jersey case, the procurement of a permit was a prerequisite both
to the distribution of hand-bills and to any canvassing or solicitation. A
member of the society known as "Jehovah's Witnesses" had been con8.
9.
10.
11.

Id. at 515.
167 U. S. 43 (1897).
Id. at 47.
308 U. S. 147 (1939).
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victed of canvassing without a permit, the briefs showing that she was
going from house to house leaving booklets and exhibiting a card suggesting a contribution to enable* the printing and distribution of similar
booklets to others. Justice Roberts, again writing for the majority, which
reversed the conviction had below, held that although a municipality concededly may enact regulations in the interests of public health, safety,
welfare or convenience, such municipal regulations may not abridge or
limit the liberties of the individual secured by the Constitution to speak,
write or otherwise circulate information or opinion. Justice Roberts went
on to point out that even though it be conceded that fraudulent appeals
may be made in the name of charity and religion, a municipality cannot
therefore require those who wish to disseminate ideas to present them
first to the police authorities for their consideration and approval. The
decision in this case is a logical consequence of course of the result reached
in Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization and illustrates again
the trend of the Court in recent years to broaden the concept of civil
liberty and to extend the rights of the individual protected by the constitutional guarantees thereof. I have no doubt that you will approve the
decision.
We come next to Thornhill v. Alabama,'" and its companion case
Carlson v. California,8 both decided on April 22nd, 1940. Here the
Court was called upon to consider the validity of state statutes which prohibited loitering or picketing about a place of business for the purpose
of inducing people not to deal with the proprietor thereof. The Court
held both ordinances which were involved invalid because they trenched
unduly upon the freedom of speech protected by the Constitution.
Justice Murphy, writing for an almost unanimous court, stated that in
the circumstances of the present day it was necessary to look upon dissemination of information concerning the facts in a labor dispute as within
the area of free discussion protected by the constitutional guarantees.
"Free discussion," he went on to say in his opinion, "concerning the
conditions in industry and the causes of labor disputes appears to us
indispensable to the effective and intelligent use of the process of popular
government, to shape the destiny of modern industrial society. The
issues raised by regulations, such as are challenged here, infringing upon
the right of employees effectively to inform the4 public of the facts of a
labor dispute are part of this larger problem."'
Perhaps you will agree with his reasoning and yet you may as I do
12.
13.
14.

310 U. S. 88 (1940).
310 U. S. 100 (1940).
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 103 (1940).
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find some interest in the question which Professor Charles 0. Gregory
of the University of Chicago Law School suggests in an article entitled
"Peaceful Picketing and Freedom of Speech"'" as to whether picketing
as such, even when of the so-called peaceful kind, constitutes so much an
exercise of free speech as it does pure and simple coercion.
Of course it is only fair to point out in this connection that in a very
recent case, Milkwagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 6
decided February 10th, 1941, the Supreme Court in an opinion by
Justice Frankfurter held that acts of picketing in themselves peaceful,
when enmeshed with contemporaneously violent conduct concededly outlawed, were properly the subject of a state court injunction under the
traditional power of equity in such cases, and that the decree therefore did
not contravene the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech. It is
interesting to note, however, as indicating the length to which some of the
justices seem inclined to go in the field of civil liberties that the majority
opinion in this case evoked vigorous dissenting opinions on the part of
Justices Reed and Black, with Justice Douglas concurring in Justice
Black's dissent.
7 decided May 20th,
We come next to Cantwell v. Connecticut,1
1940,
and we deal now with a case that touches not only free speech and free
assembly but also the free exercise of religion as well. In this case, which
like the Schneider case above referred to concerned members of the sect
known as "Jehovah's Witnesses," which has been to the Supreme Court
in various controversies three times since 1939, the Court reversed a conviction below and held invalid a Connecticut statute which forbade
solicitation of money for religious purposes without obtaining a prior
permit. The Court reaffirming its views suggested in earlier cases"8 held
specifically that religious liberty guaranteed against federal encroachment by the First Amendment to the Constitution was one of the liberties
protected likewise from state interference by the Fourteenth Amendment.
It also reverted to its old distinction laid down as far back as the Mormon
cases,' 9 between freedom of religious belief, which is absolute, and freedom
of action motivated thereby which necessarily is Subject to some regulation for the protection of society. Justice Roberts, writfiig for a
unanimous court, stresses this distinction when he says:
"The constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject of religion has a
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

A. B. A. J. Vol. XXVI, p. 709, Sept. 1940.
312 U. S. 287 (1941).
310 U. S. 296 (1940).
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923); Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U. S. 245 (1934).
Reynolds v. U. S., 98 U. S. 145 (1878); Davis v. Beason, 133 U. S. 333 (1890).
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double aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance
of any creed or the practice of any form of worship. Freedom of conscience and
freedom to adhere to such religious organizations or form of worship as the
individual may choose, cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion. Thus the Amendment
embraces two concepts,-freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is
absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains
subject to regulation for the protection of society. The freedom to act must have
appropriate definition to preserve the enforcement of that protection. In every
case the power to regulate must be so exercised as not, in attaining a permissible
20
end, unduly to infringe the protected freedom."
Again, although you may condemn as I do, the conduct and the fanaticism of the appellants in this case, in intruding into a predominantly
Catholic neighborhood and playing a phonograph record on the public
streets attacking the Catholic church and the Catholic faith, you will agree
nevertheless, I am sure, that the Court's decision holding the statute
invalid, was sound.
You may of course have noted by this time that although as Professor
Kennedy suggested in his lecture in this series, "The New Constitutionalism,"" a recent phenomenon of the Supreme Court's consideration of
cases involving the validity of statutes, state and federal, has been its
obviously pronounced unwillingness and insistent refusal to act as a
judicial censor of legislative bodies, yet in the field of civil liberty which
we have been considering this evening the tendency is in exactly an
opposite direction, and the Court has struck down statute after statute
involving freedom of speech and freedom of assembly as undue encroachments on the liberties of the citizen. In these times with the spread of
totalitarian doctrines throughout the world this tendency may be a sound
and healthy one, particularly if its basis be a continuing recognition of the
American doctrine enunciated in our Declaration of Independence which
I quoted at the outset of my remarks this evening, that the state exists
for the good of the individual essentially and not the individual for the
state, or, putting it another way, that in the natural order of things the
individual and the family came first and hence have natural rights which
are not dependent upon the whim of any system of government.
However, we have yet to deal with one of the most important cases in
20. Cantwell v. Conn., 310 U. S. 296, 303 (1940).
21. Address delivered on March 5, 1941 at the House of the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York at the opening session of the series of Lectures on Law in Its
Relation to Government, Industry and Liberty, held under the auspices of the School of
Law of Fordham University to commemorate the Centenary of the University.
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the group of decisions in the field of civil liberties to which we are directing our attention this evening, namely, Minersville School District v.
2
This case was decided on the last day of the term of the
Gobitis."
Supreme Court on June 3rd, 1940. In this controversy also, a member
of the sect known as "Jehovah's Witnesses" which has been the occasion
of so much recent constitutional excitement was involved. Briefly, two
children had been expelled from the public schools of Minersville,
Pennsylvania, for refusing as required by a school regulation having the
force of law, to salute the national flag as part of a daily school exercise.
The children conscientiously believed that such a gesture was forbidden
by sacred Scripture, and in a suit by their father the lower courts had
restrained enforcement of the regulation as to them. The Supreme Court
of the United States, by a vote of eight to one, reversed the judgment
below and held the regulation enforceable. The opinion of Justice
Frankfurter writing for the majority of the Court, seems based on the
supposed fact that the necessity of fostering national unity through inculcating loyalty for the flag transcends all other considerations. Thus
in the opinion he says:
"The ultimate foundation of a free society is the binding tie of cohesive sentiment. Such a sentiment is fostered by all those agencies of the mind and spirit
which may serve to gather up the tradition of a people, . . 'We live by symbols.'
The flag is the symbol of our national unity, transcending all internal differences,
however large, within the framework of the Constitution .... The precise issue,

then, for us to decide is whether the legislatures of the various states and the
authorities in a thousand counties and school districts of this country are barred
from determining the appropriateness of various means to evoke that unifying
23
sentiment without which there can ultimately be no liberties, civil or religious.1
All of this of course sounds patriotic and plausible, particularly at a
time of great national peril such as confronts us presently. Yet it is
difficult to avoid the logic of Justice Stone's ringing dissent when he says:
"The law which is thus sustained is unique in the history of Anglo-American
legislation. It does more than suppress freedom of speech and more than
prohibit the free exercise of religion, which concededly are forbidden by the
First Amendment and are violations of the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth.
. . .It is not denied that such compulsion is a prohibited infringement of
personal liberty, freedom of speech and religion, guaranteed by the Bill of Rights,
except in so far as it may be justified and supported as a proper exercise of the
state's power over public education....
"Concededly the constitutional guarantees of personal liberty are not always
22.
23.

310 U. S. 586 (1940).
Id. at 596.
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absolutes. Government has a right to survive and powers conferred upon it are
not necessarily set at naught by the express prohibitions of the Bill of Rights.
It may make war and raise armies. . . . It may suppress religious practices
dangerous to morals, and presumably those also which are inimical to public
safety, health and good order.... But it is a long step, and one which I am
unable to take, to the position that government may, as a supposed educational
measure and as a means of disciplining the young, compel public affirmations
' 24
which violate their religious conscience.
Certainly it seems that Justice Stone's point of view which coincides
with that expressed by Chief Judge Lehman of our own Court of Appeals
in his moving concurring opinion in People v. Sandstrom25 expresses the
sounder doctrine.
Where does the decision of the majority in the Gobitis case leave us
with reference to civil liberty and the constitutional guarantees thereof?
Certainly whatever the explanation of the attitude of the majority-and
one explanation is that it represents merely the Court's view suggested
by other cases that the state may impose any conditions it chooses with
reference to participation in school ceremonies upon attendance at public
schools, with the alternative to the non-conformist of educating his
children at his own expense-the decision hardly can be reconciled with
the more recent liberal views of the Court in the other cases involving
civil liberty, to which we have referred. It may well be that the decision
ultimately will be found to be of very limited application, although even
in such an event it is unfortunate. Of course it could be very significant if
it were symptomatic of the trend of the Court over the last several years
to pay less and less attention to the doctrine of stare decisis. Indeed, right
in the field of civil liberties to which we have been directing our attention
this evening we have an instance of this trend in the decision of the
Court in Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization,supra as compared with its earlier view in Davis v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
Moreover the opinion of Justice Frankfurter in the Gobitis case itself
serves to cast considerable doubt on the continuing juristic validity of
the historic decision in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,2" the so-called Oregon
school case. Thus while the opinion of Justice McReynolds in the
Oregon case stresses the natural right of the parent to educate his children
and the fact that the child is not the mere creature of the state, Justice
Frankfurter, writing for the majority in the Gobitis case, while citing the
Oregon case as an authority suggests that the result there reached is
24. Id. at 601.
25. 279 N. Y. 523, 533, 18 N. E. (2d) 840, 844 (1939).
26. 268 U. S. 510 (1925).
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"because of reluctance to permit a single iron-cast system of education
to be imposed upon a nation compounded of so many strains . ..."27 Is
this to be taken to mean that policy merely and not natural right is now
to be regarded as the basis of a parent's right to control the education of
his children? Other illustrations of the same trend away from stare decisis
will come readily enough to mind, in cases like Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,28 which reversed a precedent that had stood for almost a century.
There is also the case of Helvering v. Hallock,2 9 which reversed earlier
decisions of the Court supposedly controlling. Justice Roberts, dissenting
in that case, with Justice McReynolds concurring with him, had this to
say about the matter:
"If there ever was an instance in which the doctrine of stare decisis should
govern, this is it. Aside from the obvious hardship involved in treating the
taxpayers in the present cases differently from many others whose cases have been
decided or closed in accordance with the settled rule, there are the weightier
considerations that the judgments now rendered disappoint the just expectations
of those who have acted in reliance upon the uniform construction of the statute
by this and all other federal tribunals; and that, to upset these precedents now,
must necessarily shake the confidence of the bar and the public in the stability of
the rulings of the courts and make it impossible for inferior tribunals to
adjudicate controversies in reliance on the decisions of this Court. To nullify
more than fifty decisions, five of them by this Court, some of which have stood
seems to
for a decade, in order to change a mere rule of statutory construction,
30
me an altogether unwise and unjustified exertion of'power.
There you have in the reasoned language of a great jurist who in no
sense can be classified as an ultra-conservative, his opinion of some of
the evils that result from refusing to follow well settled rules and
principles laid down in previous cases.
If indeed, then, the explanation of the result in the Gobitis and other
cases really is an abandonment or a substantial disregard of stare decisis
as a binding guide in constitutional interpretation, then may we not well
inquire "What price civil liberty?"
Chief Judge Irving Lehman of our New York Court of Appeals, delivering the annual address at the meeting of the New York State Bar
Association held at the Hotel Waldorf Astoria on the evening of January
24th, 1941, in discussing the general problem put it well when he said:
"There are some, indeed, who say that the law of this land, as pronounced and
27. 310 U. S. 586, 598, 599 (1940).
28. 304 U. S. 64 (1938).
29. 309 U. S. 106 (1940).
30. Id. at 129.
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administered by the highest court of this land, in January, 1937, was very
different from the law of the land, pronounced and administered by the same
Court in January, 1941; or even, some say, in January, 1938. If history could
prove that these changes in the law have come through decrees of legislative
bodies in the exercise of their unrestrained will, or by judges who determine what
is the law in accordance with their own judgment and benevolent will instead of
'by the artificial reason and judgment of law,' then what we call law is, indeed,
only a fiction, and what we call liberty is not an inalienable right but is a
privilege which may be granted or withheld by the will and in accordance with
the judgment of those who control the government or administer the courts.
Judicial despotism, though benevolent, is hardly to be preferred to a despotism
of the majority in the State, and the tyranny of a majority, unrestrained by law,
may threaten the fundamental rights of individuals no less than the despotism of
a single man."
Chief Justice Hughes once made the now famous statement that "the
Constitution is what the judges say it is." 1 In the sense in which he
doubtless meant it, that it is the function of the judicial branch of the
government to apply the Constitution to, and interpret its meaning on, the
facts of any particular case where a constitutional question is involved,
the statement is valid and sound. In the sense in which it is sometimes
sought to be employed, by jurisprudes of the realist and surrealist schools
that precedents may be disregarded and that you may change your Constitution merely by changing your judges, it is vicious and misleading.
And yet, abandon the doctrine of stare decisis completely, and that is
precisely what the statement must come to mean and nothing else. In
such case the civil liberty of today may well become the civil tyranny
of tomorrow. In such case the guarantees contained in our Bill of Rights
become just so many platitudes written in the shifting sands of individual
judicial idiosyncracy. In such case we may well inquire again, "What
price civil liberty?"
31. The statement was contained in an address delivered while Governor of New York
at Elmira, New York. The complete passage containing the statement appears in the
Record of Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States Senate
on the Reorganization of the Federal Judiciary, Part 2, at p. 186.
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